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Encyclopedia entry on “BELLAH, Robert Neelly (1927- )”
Published as:
“Robert N. Bellah” by Richard L. Wood, in The Dictionary of Modern
American Philosophers, John R. Shook (ed.), Thoemmes Press (2005).

Robert N. Bellah was born on February 23, 1927 in Altus, Oklahoma, where his
father was a small town newspaper publisher, and raised in Los Angeles, California. In
1949 he married Melanie Bellah. He graduated summa cum laude in 1950 from Harvard
College with a degree in Social Relations and a concentration in Social Anthropology.
His undergraduate honors thesis focused on Southern Athabascan cultural patterns in
the Southwest, and was published in 1952 as Apache Kinship Systems. He pursued
doctoral studies under the leading social theorist of the period, Talcott Parsons, earning
his Ph.D. in sociology and Far Eastern languages from Harvard University in 1955. His
dissertation was a Weberian analysis of the role of religion in the modernization of
Japan, and was published as Tokugawa Religion in 1957. This formative period
coincided with the systematic effort within American social science to translate the
works of the European founders of sociology, particularly Max Weber and Emile
Durkheim (with their roots in the philosophical work of Hegel) into English, and to
incorporate their insights into an overall theory of social relations. Though the resulting
school of Astructural functionalism@ was later rejected by most social scientists B and in
some ways transcended in Bellah=s own work B this attention to American and
European currents of social thought would mark his entire career.
Bellah=s undergraduate engagement with Marxist politics and the McCarthyinspired closure of intellectual freedom in the United States during the 1950s led to his
acceptance of a post-doctoral fellowship at the Institute for Islamic Studies at McGill
University in Toronto, where he studied from 1955 to 1957. He returned to Harvard in
1957, and until 1967 served as a research associate, lecturer, associate professor, and
professor of sociology. In 1967, Bellah became the Ford Professor of Sociology at the
University of California at Berkeley, where he remained until his retirement as Elliott
Professor of Sociology, Emeritus in 1997 (a more complete autobiographical sketch is
available in the introduction to Bellah 1970).
In developing a theoretical framework for interpreting empirical sociological
findings, Bellah has drawn on the classical sociological tradition of Marx, Weber, and
Durkheim and on a long tradition of social thought within philosophy, particularly
Aristotle, Hegel, and the American pragmatists, as interpreted by such contemporary
philosophers as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. Thus, although little of Bellah=s
oeuvre is explicitly philosophical in tone, much of it carries important philosophical
weight through its wide-ranging attention to classical and contemporary social theory,
American and European social philosophy, and the philosophy of religion from both
Eastern and Western traditions. The important contributions of Bellah=s research and
teaching include his long focus on an interpretive and humanistic understanding of
social analysis (during a period of narrowly positivist emphasis within much of American
sociology) and his having helped to shape several generations of scholars in the

sociology of religion, the sociology of culture, religious studies, and social theory.
Bellah=s most important works fall into three areas. His earliest works cited above
focused on applying a Weberian intellectual framework to two important societal
systems never systematically analyzed by Max Weber: the tribal societies of the
Americas (using Apache societies as the case study) and Japan during the Tokugawa
Period (1600-1868). During this period, and partly under the influence of theologian
Paul Tillich (1952), he also re-engaged intellectually and personally with the Christian
tradition, ultimately as a member of the Episcopal Church. Bellah=s middle period
focused on the role of religion and religion-like phenomena as the central cultural
systems of society. The core insights of this period are found in three publications:
AReligious Evolution,@ ACivil Religion in America@ (1964 and 1967, both reprinted in
Bellah 1970), and the introduction to Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society (1973).
This period brought a more profoundly Durkheimian cast to Bellah=s analysis,
particularly in his attention to the dynamics of collective effervescence and shared
mental structures in society. In this vein, Bellah analyzed the ceremonies, symbolism,
and concepts of civic and religious currents in American life. Finally, beginning in the
1970s, Bellah=s work turned increasingly toward critical engagement with American
culture and institutions in a genre he termed Asociology as public philosophy.@ In two coauthored books (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton 1985, 1991) and myriad
magazine articles and public lectures, Bellah emerged as a leading public intellectual
calling for reform within American society, within the tradition of Walter Lippman, John
Dewey, H. Reinhold Niebuhr, John Courtney Murray SJ, and, before them, Jonathan
Edwards, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and W.E.B. Dubois.
Sociology understood as public philosophy strives to provide a tool for societal
self-understanding and self-reflection by entering into an ongoing dialogue with the
cultural currents that flow within and provide meaning in social life B metaphorically
holding up a mirror to society in a way that allows members to reflect upon and thus
critically re-appropriate their own cultural traditions. Such public philosophy is skeptical
of attempts in recent decades by the social sciences to emulate the physical or
biological sciences, with their focus on accumulating objective knowledge of relatively
fixed phenomena. It questions the disciplinary gulf between social sciences and the
humanities B particularly philosophy B and seeks to reconnect them by drawing on
social scientific knowledge and social theory for the purpose of better-informed and
more democratic public dialogue about society and its direction. Sociology as public
philosophy thus combines an analytic and a normative intent, simultaneously pursuing
firmer knowledge, deeper insight, and a voice in the shaping of a good society. Oriented
to the pursuit and promotion of the Aristotelian virtues of phronesis (practical reason),
public philosophy seeks to deepen democracy through public dialogue that crosses the
boundaries of philosophy, the humanities more broadly, the social sciences, and the
physical sciences.
In Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (1985),
Bellah and his co-authors fundamentally criticized the recent dominance of longstanding
American cultural currents of Autilitarian individualism@ and Aexpressive individualism.@
Key philosophical figures in the tradition of utilitarian individualism include Hobbes,
Locke, and Bentham, with their emphasis on the self-interested pursuit of particular
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ends by maximizing one=s own share of those ends. Benjamin Franklin represents the
paradigmatic American figure in this tradition. Though most at home in the business
sphere, utilitarian individualism has become a dominant cultural theme across a great
deal of American culture, most clearly wherever economic exchange, self-interest
maximization, and cost-benefit analysis explicitly predominate, but also implicitly at work
wherever human goods are treated as commodities to be maximized. In the scholarly
domain, the dominant versions of utilitarian individualism take the form of rational actor
models of human behavior.
Expressive individualism emerged in American life in the 19th century, partly in
opposition to the rising dominance of utilitarian individualism. It posits an inner core of
emotion, intimate experience, and uniqueness to each individual, which must be
expressed in pursuit of self-realization. The fountainhead of expressive individualism in
American culture was 19th century Romanticism, best exemplified in the poetry of Walt
Whitmann (1819-92); its contemporary expressions include the influential American
culture of psychotherapy, ANew Age@ spirituality, and the celebration of sexuality devoid
of grounding in interpersonal commitment.
In criticizing the inability of utilitarian and expressive individualism to ground longterm commitment and provide ultimately meaningful orientation to human life, Bellah
and his co-authors argued for a cultural re-appropriation of other longstanding currents
that relativize individualism, particularly cultural currents of civic republicanism and
biblical religion. The American tradition of civic republicanism originated in the citystates of classical Greece and Rome and deeply influenced the founding generation of
the American Revolution. The republican tradition emphasizes shared membership in a
national community and commitment to work for the common good of all societal
members. Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln represent key figures in this current
of American life B though Lincoln also drew deeply from the biblical tradition in framing
his understanding of America.
Biblical religion matters enormously in American culture because it provides
ethical grounding for trans-individualistic commitment in human life through participation
in Acommunities of memory.@ Bellah=s analysis of biblical religion as a key cultural
tradition providing a counterweight to the dark side of American individualism should not
be mistaken for a triumphal celebration of mainstream religion. Given their historical
centrality in American culture, Christianity and Judaism inevitably serve as the focus of
analysis, but they are important because they offer cultural symbols transcending
individualism and are the locus of widespread commitment within American society.
Other religious traditions B particularly others with long historical experience and societal
roots B have parallel ethical resources and can play similar roles in contemporary
American society. Likewise, Bellah et alia recognize and sharply criticize those ways in
which biblical religions themselves have succumbed to the corrosive effects of
individualism and therapeutic culture. Thus, some religious traditions some of the time
offer vibrant resources in this regard, while others do not.
Implicit in this cultural analysis and made explicit in The Good Society (1991) by
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the same authors, is the role of institutions in sustaining the cultural possibility of ethical
commitment and in providing the settings in which such commitment is exercised. The
term Ainstitutions@ is used in its social scientific sense, quite different from the everyday
sense in which it essentially serves as a synonym for Aorganization.@ Rather, institutions
here refers to Apatterns of normative, which is to say moral, expectations@ (1991, p.
288). Thus, institutions shape interpersonal and societal understandings of how we are
to act and what constitute legitimate ends and means; institutions serve to stabilize
interaction by generating mutually shared expectations. Because institutions mediate
between the self and the wider world (in both is social and natural dimensions), they are
crucial to our individuality and to our understanding of others, science, and our place in
the world. The focus of attention in The Good Society falls on analyzing particular
institutional spheres in American life B the market, corporations, and work; government,
law, and politics; education; and religion B but the underlying orientation rests constantly
upon this attention to the ways that we are embedded in institutions and can work to
reform them from within. Because institutions in the form of mutual expectations exist
within the fabric of interaction, each of us as social actors either reify current institutional
commitments or reform them by calling institutions back to their ideals and criticizing
their basic values. We do the latter typically by seeing a given institution B say, the
workplace B in light of the values and commitments of another institutional sphere B say
religion with its call to mutual respect, or politics with its call to greater equality. In this
way, institutional reform depends upon a rich plurality of strong institutional spheres;
each strengthens the others by providing cultural resources for critique and reform.
The most consistent objection raised to the line of argument pursued in these
works argues that, in their close attention to moral traditions and democratic public
dialogue, Bellah and his co-authors fail to take seriously enough the workings of societal
power. Though certainly recognizing that more power-centered analyses have their own
value, and having pursued in earlier writings those related to race (1992 [1975]) and in
recent public lectures those related to economic polarization in American society, Bellah
ultimately emphasizes the ways that cultural patterns shape even the workings of
societal power; thus, in the concluding pages of The Good Society, he and his coauthors argue, ASuch a moral argument cannot alone produce significant institutional
change. Power and profit are always involved. But where moral agreement is strong
enough, it will find opportunities for breaking through, and power and profit will find it
advantageous to go along. Such outcomes cannot occur without conflict, when power is
pitted against power. But without the moral argument, there is no steady pressure to
bring destructive economic and political forces to the service of human ends@ (1991, p.
306).
Throughout Bellah=s work runs a consistent theoretical position termed Asymbolic
realism@ which, though only discussed explicitly in a few places, is central to
understanding the philosophical substratum of that work. Best articulated in the essay
ABetween Religion and Social Science@ (Chapter 15 in Bellah 1970), symbolic realism
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rejects both the anti-religious bias of Enlightenment rationalism, which sees religion as
essentially false, and its main alternative in the Western intellectual tradition, termed
symbolic reductionism. The latter accepts that religious insight may hold a kernel of
truth, but that this kernel must be extracted from the fantastic myths and fabrications of
traditional religion; that is, whatever religious truth may exist can and must be reduced
to its non-religious core. Bellah argues that symbolic reductionism misses the real
import of religion because it partakes in the mistaken cognitive bias of Western
rationalism since the Enlightenment: AThis position has held that the only valid
knowledge is in the form of falsifiable scientific hypotheses. The task then with respect
to religion has been to discover the falsifiable propositions hidden within it, to discard
the unverifiable assertions and those clearly false, and, even with respect to the ones
that seem valid, to abandon the symbolic and metaphorical disguise in which they are
cloaked@ (251).
Bellah=s symbolic realism instead strives to understand symbolic statements B
centrally including religious symbols, rituals, narratives, etc. B not as cognitive
statements about the nature of the self or of external reality, but as evocations of the
real relationship between the self, others, the wider world, and ultimate reality. Thus,
Areality is seen to reside not just in the object but in the subject, and particularly in the
relation between subject and object. The canons of empirical science apply primarily to
symbols that attempt to express the nature of objects, but there are nonobjective
symbols that express the feelings, values, and hopes of subjects, or that organize and
regulate the flow of interaction between subjects and objects, or that attempt to sum up
the whole subject-object complex or even point to the context or ground of that whole.
These symbols, too, express reality and are not reducible to empirical propositions. This
is the position of symbolic realism@ (252). Thus, though ultimately Bellah states
polemically, ATo put it bluntly, religion is true@ (253), the fundamental point is that to
make primary the cognitive question about truth is to miss the essential nature of
religion and symbolism more generally: they attempt to express what is real in the world
of human experience, rather than what is true in some abstract cognitive sense lying
beyond human experience. He notes: Areligious symbolization and religious experience
are inherent in the structure of human existence... all reductionism must be abandoned.
Symbolic realism is the only adequate basis for the social scientific study of religion.
When I say religion is a reality sui generis I am certainly not supporting the claims of the
historical realist theologians, who are still working with a cognitive conception of
religious belief that makes it parallel to objectivist scientific description. But if the
theologian comes to his subject with the assumptions of symbolic realism...then we are
in a situation where for the first time in centuries theologian and secular intellectual can
speak the same language. Their tasks are different but their conceptual framework is
shared. What this can mean for the reintegration of our fragmented culture is almost
beyond calculation@ (253).
Throughout his career B in his analysis of the religious systems of Japanese and
Apache societies, his theoretical work on religious phenomena as cultural systems, and
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his work as a public philosopher B Bellah has been oriented by this commitment to
symbolic realism. This orientation and Bellah=s role in training several generations of
scholars at Harvard University, the University of California at Berkeley, and the
Graduate Theological Union have made Bellah a key figure in the late 20th century
dialogue between religion and social science, not only in America but in multiple
societies around the world. Since his retirement from teaching in 1997, he has
continued to lecture widely while working on a final major work, an expansion and
updating of the seminal work AReligious Evolution@ (1970, Chapter 2) in light of recent
scholarly understanding of human origins, prehistoric societies, human history, and
genetic and cultural evolution.
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